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Kicking Off in Brazil: Manifesting Democracy 
Maite Conde and Tariq Jazeel  
 
On 6 June, nine days before the Confederations Cup was due to kick off in Brasilia, 
the first of a series of public protests – ‘manifestações’ – began in São Paulo (figure 
1). They quickly swept across Brazil, rippling through at least 70 cities, including Rio 
de Janeiro, Belem, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Fortaleza and Brasilia. The 
manifestações have received widespread media attention and critical commentary 
both within Brazil and overseas. As we write this dispatch they continue to evolve, 
such that, as Emir Sader (2013) has put it, any attempt to explain away the protests 
would be tantamount to a form of reductionism. In fact, something of the difficulty to 
easily ‘deal with’ the manifestações has been part of their political and cultural 
vigour. In this dispatch we signpost a number of issues that the manifestações raise in 
Brazil’s current conjuncture, focusing on urban and class politics, and state violence, 
which we suggest are central to the historical context and ongoing dynamics of the 
manifestações. We also raise some issues around political mediation and 
representation in Brazil, and discuss the uneven developmental politics of Brazil’s so-
called ‘emerging economy’ identity, about which we suggest the manifestações pose 
challenging questions.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 2 
First, however, it is worth stressing the manifestações’ absolute inseparability 
from football. Over the past year, Brazil has anticipated being in the global spotlight. 
The Confederations Cup held in June was the country’s dress rehearsal for the 
Football World Cup that Brazil will host next year. As has been well reported, 
preparations for the event were far from straightforward. Out of the six planned 
stadiums only two were delivered within FIFA’s scheduled timetable, and likewise 
transportation and infrastructure projects were beset by a number of problems. 
Nonetheless, by the start of the Confederations Cup stadiums were renovated, hotels 
primed, and restaurants and bars across the country expectant. In an impressive 
turnaround, Brazil seemed prepared for the world’s gaze, and moreover, ready to 
assert itself on the global stage.  
Come kick-off on 15 June, however, Brazil held the world’s gaze for very 
different reasons; the manifestações were in full swing. Initially organized by the 
Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), the Free Fare Movement, protests began as opposition 
to a 7% increase in public transportation costs.1 Metro fares in São Paulo, for 
instance, rose from $R3.00 to $R3.20, a significant increase for the city’s minimum 
wage earners who on average spend one fifth of their salaries on public transport. 
Thousands of Paulistas took to the streets demanding zero-fare transport at a time 
when conspicuous spending on the Confederations Cup was evident to so many. The 
Confederations Cup catalyzed the protests, just as it provided the perfect global stage 
for the manifestações. 
 
Democracy and the ‘Right to the City’: Contextualizing the Manifestações 
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Public protests are not uncommon in São Paulo. The manifestaçaõ is an integral 
component of the city. In the three months leading up to the June protests, for 
example, the Movimento sem teto (Homeless movement), and the Sindicato dos 
trabalhadores das universidades federais no estado de São Paulo (Union of Federal 
University Workers in the State of São Paulo) led marches through the city, voicing 
demands and highlighting deficiencies in state provision.  
To stress that São Paulo is no stranger to public protest is to underscore a key 
fact: while inequality is a salient characteristic of Brazilian cities, as Teresa Caldeira 
remarks, ‘in the past decades both the marks and the meanings of inequality and the 
relationships and spaces in which they are manifested and reproduced have changed 
considerably’ (2012: 385). In fact, one could now tentatively suggest that São Paulo 
(along with other Brazilian cities) has become something of a democratic space in so 
far as manifestações are quite normal, that people, largely the poor and marginalized, 
routinely assert their presence and voice through such performative articulations. This 
urban presencing, what Saskia Sassen has referred to as ‘urban capabilities’ (2012), 
not only offers marginalized groups new forms of visibility, ‘it also expresses new 
forms of political agency, expanding the openness of the city’s democratic public 
sphere’ (Caldeira 2012: 385).  
All this is relatively normal in the only country in the world that, since 2001, 
has constitutionally guaranteed the ‘right to the city’. A term first coined by Henri 
Lefebvre (1996, pp.63-184), the ‘right to the city’ is an abstract formulation denoting 
an imperative for the city’s marginalized to become part of its production, and for 
urban development to meet basic social needs before serving in the interest of capital 
accumulation. In Brazil, however, this urban theoretical abstraction has been 
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putatively grounded by an alliance of social movements, squatters, NGOs and 
academics that ensured it was enshrined in the 2001 City Statute of Brazil’s 
constitution – a statute emphasizing democratic urban management, the city’s ‘social’ 
function as a priority for urban development, and the well being of urban inhabitants. 
As utopian as this sounds, this constitutional protection of the ‘right to the city’ 
emerged from the strange collision of neoliberalism and democratization that has been 
key to Brazilian developmentalism since the 1990s (Harvey 2012: xiv).  
The expansion of political expression through Brazilian urban space took root 
much earlier, however, in the late 70s and early 80s, when social movements in São 
Paulo and beyond brought residents from the peripheries into the political arena. Their 
appearance followed the ‘opening up’ of political debate in Brazil, where after the 
1964 military takeover, citizen groups disappeared. The process of abertura began in 
1977 and mobilized diverse sectors of the population, including women’s groups and 
trade unions, to make their demands heard and generate spaces for oppositional 
movements. This new left became active in recreating a civil society, advocating for 
anti-authoritarianism and expanding the terrain of politics by calling for discussions 
of the links between everyday life and institutionalized power. Their mobilizations 
took to city squares, their claims for rights were incorporated in the constitution, and 
their ways of organizing became central to insurgent forms of citizenship that enabled 
a transition towards Brazil’s modern political landscape (Holston 2008). Social 
movements also provoked qualitative changes to urban space, forcing the expansion 
of infrastructures and public services. It was during these years that ‘democracy took 
root’ (Caldeira 2012: 387). In the past decade, democracy has continued to penetrate 
deeply into Brazilian society, evolving way beyond the predictable realms of elections 
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and party politics. Indeed, São Paulo’s frequent manifestações signal forms of 
political expression that routinely use urban space for creative democratic articulation.  
These days, the streets of São Paulo are the stage for varied forms of popular 
participation. The metropolis is home to politically inflected graffiti and tagging –  
pixacões (figure 2). It is also striated by skateboarding and parkoor, rap and 
breakdancing. Since the 1990s, these practices have embedded themselves in the 
urban landscape, marking it, re-signifying it and taking it over.2 These urban 
mobilizations, and the subtle forms of political expression in Brazil they signal, 
challenge long held stereotypical views of the population’s passivity and the country’s 
spirit of ‘cordiality’ that position conflicts in public space as anathema to national 
identity. They also force us to reevaluate ideas of Brazil’s undemocracy, which have 
described universal notions such as citizenship and the public sphere as ‘limited and 
contingent,’ a legacy of patron-clientelism from the colonial period (Hanchard 1994). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Despite the ubiquity of urban political expression, as Caldeira (2012) affirms, 
such spatial movements have been by no means mainstream. Practitioners of these 
tactics typically constitute a minority of São Paulo’s residents, who by and large stem 
from the working class. The MPL in this respect is significantly different in so far as 
it has considerable middle class membership, and almost half of its followers are 
young college students whose families earn five times the minimum salary (Ibope in 
Pissardo 2013).3 The recent manifestações and their particular urban interventions, 
 6 
therefore, represent broader class participation than previously associated with spatial 
and social tactics in Brazilian cities. As Sader writes, while Brazil’s social movements 
have traditionally been linked to the working class and marginalized, the MPL 
‘represents a new generation and also a new challenge’ (2013). 
 
Violence, Escalation and Emergent Class Concerns 
In the early stages of the manifestações, the MPL’s demands were dismissed and their 
protests largely condemned. Politicians denounced the demonstrations, with Geraldo 
Alckmin, governor of the state of São Paulo, describing participants as ‘vandals’ and 
‘troublemakers.’ Journalists especially attacked the protests. Veja columnist Reinaldo 
Azevedo, for example, labeled demonstrators ‘terrorists’, and Globo’s Arnaldo Jabor 
compared the MPL to São Paulo’s principal criminal organization, the ‘Primeiro 
Comando da Capital’. Such condemnation exposed an authoritarian streak running 
through the Brazilian establishment. For many, this was confirmed on June 13th, when 
the state’s unaccountable and ill-trained military police reacted to the mostly peaceful 
demonstrations with extreme violence. Using pepper spray, plastic bullets, tear gas, 
and stun grenades, the police indiscriminately attacked fleeing protestors and 
bystanders, injuring many. They arrested demonstrators found with vinegar (used to 
lessen the effect of tear gas) and hunted stragglers through the streets. This brutality 
provoked widespread outrage and drew thousands to a cause about which they might 
not otherwise have been aware. The press too changed its tune after reporters from 
São Paulo’s main newspapers O Estado de São Paulo and Folha de São Paulo found 
themselves on the receiving end of the military police’s violence. Mass mobilizations 
soon spread across Brazil, reaching unprecedented numbers. On 20 June, more than a 
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million people took to the streets in 75 cities across the country, visibly affirming 
their right to protest – their right to the city.  
While the manifestações began with specific aims – to reduce the fare increase 
– as they grew, they took on more diffuse demands that transcended class boundaries; 
as demonstrators sang, ‘Não é só vinte centavos.’ They turned into protests about a 
range of issues: the military police's brutality, the impunity and privilege of 
politicians, the state’s neglect of the peoples’ needs and poor levels of public service. 
Demonstrations were also catalysed by a more specific anger at political corruption 
and the perceived failure of democracy in Brazil. Protestors denounced the legislation 
known as PEC37 that would limit the power of federal prosecutors to investigate 
crimes. Many feared the laws would hinder attempts to jail corrupt politicians. 
Federal prosecutors were behind the investigation into the biggest corruption case in 
Brazil’s history, the ‘mensalão,’ a cash for votes scheme that came to light in 2005 
and involved top aides of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva buying off 
members of congress to vote for their legislation. Last year the Supreme Court 
condemned two-dozen people in connection with the case, hailed as a watershed 
moment in Brazil’s fight against political corruption and impunity. Most of those 
condemned, however, have yet to be jailed because of ongoing appeals. The 
mensalão, and subsequent failure to convict those found guilty, have brought home a 
popular belief that while Brazil has in theory been committed to Republicanism, the 
country has yet to fully realize its liberal principles. The military police’s brutal 
response to initial protests was a reminder that popular forms of struggle and 
organization are still repressed, that formal and abstract ideals of equality before the 
law are still not present in Brazil, that politicians and the elite continue to live above 
the law, and that legality remains constituted as a fatal cycle of the arbitrary judgment 
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of those in power. For Marilena Chauí (2011), these factors are markers of 
authoritarianism; an authoritarianism that in Brazil has roots in the Iberian history of 
colonization and was reinforced by the dictatorship of 1964. That manifestantes 
fought back against military police violence can be read then, not just a sign that the 
people will no longer stand for corruption and impunity, but also as a demand for the 
end of all traces of Brazilian authoritarianism. In this respect, today’s manifestações 
take up the demands for anti-authoritarian politics that were central to the social 
movements of the 70s and 80s.   
But if the protests highlight unresolved issues from the past, they also bring to 
light key differences between now and then, not least if we ask why the protests 
erupted at this particular moment? Seeking to answer this question, many have sought 
to underscore commonalities between the demonstrations and other recent global 
movements: protests across the Arab world, Occupy in the UK and the USA, student 
demonstrations in Chile, the Indignados in Spain, and other flash points throughout 
the world. These escalations have been linked to some or all of the following: 
government repression, high youth-unemployment, falling living standards and anger 
over immigration. One can certainly insert Brazil’s manifestações into a comparativist 
framework that links together the élan and social dynamics of all these mass public 
protests, especially when the role of social media is brought into the frame (see 
below). At the same time, however, Brazil is a very different story.  
Since the Worker’s Party came to power in 2003, the country has been 
seemingly transformed. Its democracy is stable. Youth unemployment is at a record 
low. The past decades have seen a sustained rise in living standards, leading to – and 
crucially so – a new and emerging middle class. For economist Angel Ubide the poor 
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allocation of public funds is an important factor for understanding the manifestações: 
‘A new middle class has emerged in recent years who began to feel that their 
economic expectations were not being met by the state’ (2013). Protesting against 
poor education, housing, transport and healthcare, as well as political corruption and 
rising inflation which has left many painfully overstretched, Brazil’s new upwardly 
mobile class, which has benefitted from the boom of recent years, now seems 
collectively conscious of the inadequacy of state provisioning and everyday 
infrastructures. For Ubide the recent protests signal ‘the awakening of the new middle 
class emerging out of poverty and underdevelopment’ (ibid.).  
It is, of course, significant that this awakening took place during the 
Confederations Cup, when the country was stage-managing its global profile. The 
manifestações have highlighted to a watching world a deep and broad mass 
articulation of anger at a smorgasbord of issues. As Barbara Szanieki (2013) notes, 
the manifestações have become polyphonous. They are characterized a multiplicity of 
demands and social actors, making it near ‘impossible to discern a collective 
discourse and consensus’.  
 
Leaderless Protest, the Challenge for Political Representation, and Social Media 
While protestors’ multiple frustrations may be patent, the manifestações have become 
somewhat inchoate, and, as some have bemoaned, leaderless (Chauí 2013; Saad Filho 
2013). Their unprecedented scale, sudden surge and veritable polyphony have left 
many perplexed. Gilberto Carvalho, Dilma Rousseff's secretary general, for one, told 
a congressional hearing, ‘it would be pretentious to say we understand what's going 
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on’ (quoted in Watts 2013). The failure to comprehend the demonstrations testifies to 
their multifaceted character.  
Vocalizing varied dissatisfactions and demands, protestors are not united by a 
common ideology or political belief. This is markedly different from the past, 
specifically from the social movements of the 70s and 80s (Chauí 2013). Led by 
workers’ movements (trade union associations), those popular protests were 
mobilized by shared and clearly specified aims and strategies: the introduction of 
social, economic and cultural rights, the right for self organization, the introduction of 
a democratic landscape with new political parties to mediate with the state. The recent 
manifestações seem to indicate that this kind of struggle has now been replaced by a 
fragmented political landscape, made up of what Augusto de Franco calls 
‘micromotives’ (2013). Thus while the manifestações may have inherited a tradition 
of political mobilization from the past, inserting themselves into the city and 
campaigning against poor public services, they represent a significant move away 
from traditional forms of party political affiliation. In this respect, it is significant that 
the MPL describes itself as ‘autonomous, independent and non-partisan.’ All of this 
opens key debates concerning politics itself, concerning organization and leadership, 
between those asserting autonomist tendencies (like the MPL) and those committed to 
more traditional party structures (including the PT). As Sader asserts (2013), the 
protests signal much more than a frustration with public infrastructures and urban 
services, they represent a challenge to the country’s political groups, to the PT in 
particular, and point to the emergence of a new, uncertain political landscape. 
‘Leaderless protest’ is not without its dangers. The abandonment of coherent 
single-issue political agendas and class driven organization can lead protests down a 
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‘flare and fizzle’ cul-de-sac (Zizek 2011; Milne 2013). Worse still, protests without 
leaders open themselves to false friends. Indeed, Brazil’s right wing groups have 
attempted to coopt and manipulate the protests to assert their own political agenda. 
For example, on 20 June members of Trade Unions and left wing groups, including 
the PT, who were participating in a São Paulo demonstration, were attacked, their 
banners destroyed and burned, by Integralists draped in the Brazilian flag, singing the 
national anthem and proclaiming ‘My party is my country.’ In response, the MPL 
immediately abandoned the demonstration, denounced the right’s attempts to hijack 
the protests, and temporarily stopped organizing manifestações. The right wing media 
have also made efforts to co-opt the demonstrations, attempting to unite the 
population against the PT government. Initially opposed to the movement, as it is with 
all popular protests, Globo reporters soon began to promote the demonstrations by 
agitating against the federal state, realizing this would help wear down support for the 
government.  
In spite of these specters from the right, and in spite of the protests’ apparent 
political incoherency, the manifestações should not be dismissed, or mistaken as a 
sign of mass political illiteracy and naïve idealism. Neither is it the case that the 
organized left has been absent from the protests, the presence of trade unions and left 
wing groups testifies otherwise. As Szaniecki (2013) writes, while the protests may 
not be impelled by collective discourse or consensus, it is nevertheless possible to 
ascertain certain commonalities through their multiplicity: namely, criticism of 
politicians and urban administrators, and a demand for a constant and direct dialogue 
with political representatives and institutions. These objectives may resonate with 
those of the 70s and 80 social movements, yet as Szaniecki stresses, they are also 
profoundly different in their emphasis on a need for direct democracy versus 
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representative democracy. This raises the question of whether and how traditional 
parties, like the PT, can respond to this call for a new kind of politics?  
The manifestações therefore expose how political parties can no longer rely 
solely on election results and opinion polls for longevity and popular approval. There 
is a need for parties to pursue ever more creative methods for constant dialogue with 
the population, what Szaniecki calls ‘continuous listening’ (2013), which in turn 
signal new temporalities of the political. This is especially pertinent for the PT given 
its grassroots origins. If, from the 1970s onwards, it was factory work that generated 
the unions, which in turn helped establish political parties linked to workers (the PT), 
there are now new forms of productive association in Brazil, especially in its cities, 
which require new forms of political organization, communication, and new ways of 
relating to and with the people (ibid.).  
Another way of approaching these challenges is to suggest how the popular 
call for more direct avenues of political engagement signaled by the manifestações, 
betrays a groundswell of opinion that the country’s politicians constitute something of 
a ‘political class’ that thinks, acts and conducts itself as a class, alienated from the 
daily conditions affecting most ordinary Brazilians. This is particularly significant for 
the PT. Some commentators have suggested that the MPL gained traction because, 
after a decade in power, the PT has lost its appetite for social mobilization. Many 
leaders of social movements linked to it are now ensconced in comfortable 
government appointed jobs, suggesting the PT has lost its connection to the people. 
The footage of President Dilma Rousseff being loudly booed by 42,000 people at the 
opening of the Confederations Cup in Brasília is telling.  In this sense, and from the 
vantage point of the street, to resist turning the energy of mass public protest into a 
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dialogue over a series of easily deliverable demands is precisely what holds the 
potential to split asunder the complacency that envelopes the political class (see Žižek 
2011).  
The role that social media has played in the manifestações is not insignificant 
in this respect. Facebook, Twitter and various citizen journalism platforms have been 
key drivers of the gathering momentum and ever-expanding articulations (in both 
senses of the word) that have constituted this informal urban politics. Placards in the 
manifestações testify as much, ‘Saimos do Facebook’, reminding that the geography 
of these protests is not contained just within urban space. The manifestações are at 
one and the same time thoroughly networked, rampantly viral, and rapidly dynamic, 
just as the urban itself is no longer isolated from the hyperconnectivity of virtual 
space. The manifestações have been fuelled by a ‘revolution in communication that is 
transforming people’s expectations of influence and voice’ (Harris 2013). Gathering 
together, voicing and manifesting ‘urban capabilities’ (Sassen 2012), has never been 
so accessible to so many. Social media has given a new generation of Brazilians direct 
and quick access to ‘the political’ in its ontological dimension (Mouffe 2005), in the 
process short-circuiting the formal channels of politics with which politicians are 
more familiar. Social media is also far richer in information and lighter on 
sensationalism than the printed newspaper and static TV coverage. As such, those 
who have taken to the streets are, in Szaniecki’s words, ‘super-productive, hyper-
informed, ultra-connected and full of opinion’ (2013). The political class’ 
unfamiliarity with the dynamics and political potential of social media has helped 
consolidate them as a political class, that is to say out of touch with everyday urban 
society. The manifestações are evidence of social media’s role in the very production 
of new kinds of participatory spatialities of ‘the political’ in late modernity.  
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What, then, of the government’s response? President Dilma Rousseff’s 
expression of pride at the demonstrations, which she said testified to ‘the energy of 
our democracy, the strength of the voice of the streets and the civility of our 
population,’4 can perhaps be read as the PT’s attempt to rise to the political challenges 
posed by the manifestações, whilst also coopting them into a historical narrative of 
change through urban protest to which the PT itself is integral. More concretely 
Dilma responded to protestors’ demands for change proposing a series of measures. 
After meeting with organizers, she encouraged local governments to reverse the 
increase in transport, which has now happened in Rio, São Paulo and other cities. She 
also promised tighter penalties for corruption through a new law that would classify it 
as a more serious crime, a R$50bn (£15bn) program for public transport, new 
measures on health and job creation and a new Public Transport Council that would 
work with civil society to expand and strengthen urban mobility projects. In addition, 
she proposed a referendum on political reform. Legislators also dropped the 
controversial PEC37 Bill to which protestors were so opposed. 
All this would suggest that the manifestações have been successful in 
achieving concrete changes, however it would be premature to celebrate the protests 
as such. On 9 July, Dilma’s call for a plebiscite on political reform was rejected in 
Congress on the grounds that it was unfeasible. Following disagreements between PT 
legislators and other groups allied to the federal administration, the leader of the 
House of Representatives, Henrique Eduardo Alves, instead suggested a commission 
of politicians to discuss the proposal. As Márcio Falcão observes, this excludes the 
people from the consultation process, ignoring calls for dialogue that have been key to 
the manifestações (2013). In July, the Senate also announced cuts to health and 
education that had previously been ring-fenced and subsidized by oil revenues. All 
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this will surely only reinforce widespread distrust of politicians and political parties, 
and further enhance their alienation from the people. Indeed, while the manifestações 
evidence calls for continuous dialogue with political representatives and institutions, 
these recent backtracks beg the question – Is anyone listening?  
 
Of the ‘B’ in ‘BRICS’? 
The protests erupted at a time when so much tax income is being conspicuously spent 
on the Confederations Cup and the World Cup; hence the manifestações’ popular 
chant, ‘Hey FIFA, paga a tarifa.’  The country has already spent R$31 billion (£9 
billion) preparing for the World Cup (R$1 billion alone was spent on refurbishing 
Rio’s Maracanã stadium), 3 times more than South Africa’s total 4 years ago. Several 
stadiums constructed for the games have been pilloried as white elephants because 
they are being built in cities with only minor teams. The new £325 million Mané 
Garrincha stadium in Brasília, for example, has a capacity of 70,000, but the Brasília 
Futebol Clube rarely attract more than a few thousand fans. It is hardly surprising 
then that many have criticized tournament spending as wasteful and have also 
critiqued FIFA’s own estimated profits, especially given the lack of resources and 
high costs of living that beset the majority of Brazilians, who currently pay the 
highest taxes of any country outside the developed world (36% of GDP) and receive 
little by way of public services (figure 3). It is no coincidence that the manifestações 
escalated during the Confederations Cup. Indeed, many of the protests used specific 
matches as platforms for their expression.  
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[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The ‘Brazil as an emerging economy’ narrative is not incidental here either. 
Despite the lack of single-issue politics, what is being expressed is the people’s sense 
that they are not benefiting economically and developmentally while the nation-
state’s international profile skyrockets and the elites’ pockets get fuller and fatter. 
Emerging economy for whom? The uneven development that is the result of Brazil’s 
embrace of neoliberalism is painfully obvious now, as the country bends over 
backwards to comply with FIFA’s binding covenants, often to devastating effect. For 
example, the next stage of Maracanã’s transformation for the World Cup will involve 
the destruction of a monument to Brazil’s indigenous groups, the demolition of a 
thriving school and the removal of its adjacent swimming baths, both of which serve 
the local community, all to make way for a fit-for-FIFA multiplex with maximal retail 
space from which to propagate as much profit, most of which will be siphoned out of 
the country by FIFA’s multi-national corporate partners.  
More devastating still is the destruction of poor neighborhoods and favelas as 
part of the process to make cities more palatable for World Cup crowds. Rio’s Favela 
do Metrô, for instance, located just 500 meters from the Maracanã stadium, was 
leveled in 2010 and its families transferred to public housing estates in the 
peripheries. This is not an isolated case. In the past four years, Mayor Eduardo Paes 
has evicted 19,000 families from 192 slums around the city (Brisolla 2013). Those 
who have not been forcibly displaced from their homes have been driven away by the 
rising costs of services (Szaniecki 2013). These urban displacements only enhance the 
relevance of the 20-cent rise in public transportation costs for those whose commutes 
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have been significantly lengthened as a direct result. Thus despite chants of ‘Não é só 
vinte centavos’, for many 20-cents remains a real issue, and perhaps as a result, an 
issue that transcends class.  
All of this testifies to just how Brazil’s development as an emerging economy 
has been built on an embrace of neoliberalism and all the social and spatial 
consequences that entails. As the country has made great efforts to become a global 
power, it has seemingly turned its back on social policies adopted by PT. These 
policies, which led to a significant reduction in poverty, the emergence of a new 
middle class, the acknowledgment of discrimination against indigenous populations 
as well as people of African descent, and a growing recognition of indigenous land 
rights and quilombolas, have been replaced with an emphasis on internationalism and 
an active role in the growing prominence of the emerging economies of the BRICS. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos writes that ‘policies aimed at social inclusion dried up, 
no longer meeting the expectations of those who felt they deserved more. The quality 
of urban life deteriorated as precedence was given to internationally prestigious 
events that ended up absorbing investments that were supposed to improve education, 
transportation and public services in general’ (2013).  
That the manifestações grew to articulate mass grievance about a range of 
issues united only by discontent at the state’s neglect of social policies and peoples’ 
basic needs, signals a familiar story about underdevelopment. Public transport, health, 
education, community leisure facilities, and even indigenous heritage, are commons 
resources that the state is turning its back on as it pursues its economic development. 
Whether this constitutes what David Harvey (2003) has referred to as ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ hinges on whether the state has turned those commons resources 
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into profitable use or not. But this is perhaps a less germane question than whether the 
state should do more to ensure it provides universal access to these commons, 
especially given its constitutional commitment to the right to the city? It is the street 
that seems to be posing the question.   
What is happening in Brazil can also force us to think about broader issues 
regarding the BRICS and their growing global presence. For example, think of the 
2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, and, of course, Brazil’s 
hosting of both of these mega-events in quick succession. As well as PR exercises, 
such events are used to boost development by accelerating investment in national 
infrastructures and, so the logic goes, provide future growth. However, as Brazilian 
protestors are showing, the costs to the people and the public purse of this kind of 
global presence raises questions about whether the money may be better spent 
improving basic foundations for society? Likewise, whether the money may be better 
invested in ensuring that Brazil’s progress is universal and benefits everyone equally 
(figure 4)? 
As we write, protests in Brazil continue. The movement that emerged in June 2013 is 
clearly much more than just two weeks of unrest in the streets. It remains unclear 
what material policies will eventually be implemented, if any. Yet, arguably, this 
matters little in the face of the larger changes to the political landscape and 
democratic process that the manifestações have precipitated. What happens in the 
future remains open. As one 22-year-old student in São Paulo put it ‘It’s a cultural 
shift for my generation’ (quoted in Brooks 2013).  
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[Figure 4 about here] 
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1 Formed in Porto Alegre in 2005, the MPL campaigns for free public transportation. See 
http://farefreebrazil.blogspot.com.br 
2 There are also other forms of cultural and political mobilization in São Paulo, notably the 
Parada Gay (Gay Parade), which brings over 3 million people to Avenida Paulista and 
Consolocao annually, and the Virada Cultural, a massive production of street shows that lasts 
24 hours. These events, however, are less spontaneous and sanctioned by the city 
administration.  
3 Both conservative commentators, like Globo TV’s Arnaldo Jabor, and left-wing writers, 
such as  Paulo Henrique Amorim, and Chico Pinheiro, have also mentioned the MPL’s 
middle class membership. 
 
4 In her first televised address to the nation on the protests, on Tuesday 18 June.   
